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Introduction

In the wake of the recent dissolution of redevelopment agencies in
California, communities across the state have lost one of their strongest
tools for cleaning up potentially productive properties deemed too
contaminated to develop without environmental remediation. The reuse of
properties contaminated with hazardous substances, known in the industry
as “brownfields,” generates a plethora of community benefits, including
accelerated economic growth, improved public health and lessened
environmental risks from latent industrial pollutants and wastes. Despite
these benefits, public and private entities alike have been historically
unwilling to take on the often onerous financial and legal risks of cleaning
up these areas in line with strict federal and state environmental regulatory

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014; B.A.,
University of Oregon, 2009. I would like to thank my wonderful friends and family for
their daily inspiration.
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requirements. In response, California redevelopment agencies (“RDAs”)
stepped in during the past few decades and became largely responsible for
the accelerating remediation of many of these brownfields sites,
engendering the economic and legal viability of many brownfields
development projects.
Despite these benefits, in 2012 California Governor Jerry Brown
ultimately succeeded in dissolving all RDAs as part of a statewide
emergency budget deficit plan. 1 Though the plan ultimately led to an influx
of millions of dollars in additional tax revenue for the state, the
accompanying dissolution of RDAs left many in local communities
wondering, “What next?” Though a number of recent legislative efforts have
attempted to solve, or at least improve, the legal and financial issues
created by the sudden dissolution of RDAs, many hurdles remain.
Stakeholders in brownfields development continue to face a number of
impediments, and legislation has thus far failed to provide adequate
remedies. The future of brownfields projects likely requires renewed
endeavors by partners in these projects, and a reshaping of the field in a
world without RDAs.

II. Brownfields Development
As an environmental and land use planning label, the term
“brownfields” has quickly gained currency the past 20 years as a popular
buzzword in urban development. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) officially defines brownfields as “real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” 2
These properties are frequently the prior sites of industrial factories and
waste disposal plants, and often take up prime real estate. Some estimates
show over 450,000 brownfields sites existing in the U.S. 3 Of these
brownfields, the EPA estimates that over 90,000 lay idle in the state of
California alone, while some private researchers estimate upwards of
117,000 such brownfields sites in the state. 4 As populations swell across the

1. CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., Redevelopment Agency Dissolution, (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.dof.ca.gov/redevelopment.
2. Brownfields, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
RESPONSE, http://epa.gov/brownfields (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).

AND

EMERGENCY

3. Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, http://epa.gov/brownfields/basic_info.htm#plan.

AND

4. Brownfields Home Page, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/
brownfields/; Corynn Brodsky, How Many Brownfields Does California Have?, CENTER FOR
CREATIVE LAND RECYCLING (2007), available at http://www.cclr.org/media/publications/
How%20Many%20Brownfields%20Does%20California%20Have.pdf.
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nation, especially in dense city spaces, urban infill continues to gain in
popularity as an attractive, and perhaps necessary, means of
redevelopment. 5 Government agencies and private developers alike look to
redevelop unused properties within city boundaries, rather than disturb
more pristine undeveloped properties and greenspaces. 6

A. The Benefits of Brownfields Development
By cleaning up contaminated sites so that the property can be
productively used, many brownfield redevelopment projects, whether public,
private, or both, have positively affected surrounding communities’
economic growth, social and neighborhood revitalization efforts, and
environmental restoration. The vast majority of brownfields sites have
negative residual land values before clean up efforts. 7 8 However, once
restored, brownfields contribute tax revenue to the state, as well as income
tax, business tax and utility tax revenues. 9 The EPA estimates that each
dollar of public funds invested in brownfields development leverages at
least $2.50 in private investment, and that every acre of brownfields cleaned
and reused saves four and a half acres of open and undeveloped space, i.e.,
space that has no buildings and is often accessible to the public. 10
Further, such projects have a number of more localized benefits. They
not only stimulate local job growth both during and after completion of the
remediation, but often increase the property values of surrounding homes. 11
In addition, brownfields redevelopment has social benefits as well, turning
community eyesores into attractive hubs and encouraging the general
holistic health of neighborhoods. 12
,

5. Henry Mayer & Michael Greenberg, Coming Back from Economic Despair: Case
Studies of Small- and Medium-Size American Cities, 20 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT QUARTERLY
232 (2001).
6.

Id.

7. Brownfields Program Achievements Linked to Early Success, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Oct. 2006), http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P100829D.pdf.
8. GROUP MCKENZIE, Brownfield/Greenfield Development Cost Comparison Study (2004),
available at http://www.portofportland.com/PDFPOP/Trade_Trans_Studies_Brnfld_Stdy_
Exec_Smry.pdf.
9.
10.

Id.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 7.

11. Corrin J. Breeding, Socio-Economic Revitalization Through Brownfield Reclamation
(2012) (Unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Tennessee), available at http://trace.
tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2486&context=utk_gradthes.
12.

Id.
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Finally, brownfields redevelopment may have unique, benefits for
California’s future energy production. The EPA believes that many
brownfields locations may serve as useful sites for new renewable energy
projects, and recently created an online tool through which public and
private developers may search for contaminated sites in California that are
potential candidates for such renewable energy development. 13 The EPA
also recently launched the “RE-Powering America’s Lands” initiative to
encourage such renewable energy development on contaminated land sites
throughout the United States. 14

B. Economic and Legal Challenges
Despite the large potential benefits of brownfields reuse, both the
costs associated with the identification and cleanup procedures at such
sites and the potential liability associated with ownership and/or
involvement with these properties present large hurdles to this kind of
development.
These costs include the price of construction and
remediation and a higher risk premium, which affects the price of
contracting insurance for the site. 15 As a result of the high cost and
potential legal liability of brownfields reuse, many private developers are
hesitant to develop such spaces. 16 Among developers, a common belief
persists that undeveloped greenspace and uncontaminated areas remain
easier and more lucrative to develop, despite their sizable distances from
population centers and attached to an altogether different set of extraneous
costs. 17 A number of complementary federal and state statutes present
significant legal hurdles to brownfields remediation as well. Federal
environmental law, most notably the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), passed by Congress
in 1980 to address serious environmental concerns with the improper
disposal of hazardous substances at sites throughout the country, puts
various constraints on brownfields development. 18 CERCLA expanded the
federal government’s ability to appropriately identify and investigate
hazardous waste releases at some of the most contaminated sites in the

13. Renewable Energy on Contaminated Lands in California, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/region9/climatechange/renewcontlands.
14. Siting Renewable Energy on Potentially Contaminated Land and Mine Sites, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oswercpa.
15.

GROUP MCKENZIE, supra note 8.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18. See CERCLA Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/super
fund/policy/cercla.htm.
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country, and thus better remediate contaminants endangering the
environment and the public’s health. 19 Towards this end, CERCLA created a
three-pronged approach to hazardous waste cleanup that: (1) enacted
substantive law concerning abandoned hazardous waste sites; (2)
established a trust fund, funded primarily by taxing the oil and chemical
industries, providing for cleanup when no responsible party could be found;
and (3) established liability for those ultimately responsible for the release
and transport of such hazardous waste. 20 While the law predominantly
focuses on the most contaminated areas, otherwise known as Superfund
sites, CERCLA’s substantive provisions also apply to brownfields. 21
CERCLA’s third prong establishes strict liability for those responsible
for the release and disposal of hazardous substances into the environment
by persons and businesses deemed “potentially responsible parties”
(“PRPs”). 22 This liability encompasses owners and operators of the property,
any person who owned the facility at which such substances were disposed,
any person who arranged for the disposal of the hazardous substances,
and/or any person who transported such substances for disposal. 23 The
government may hold any of the above parties strictly liable for all costs of
removal incurred by both federal and state governments, as well as
collecting damages for the destruction of natural resources and costs of
health assessments. 24

C. Federal Policies
As enacted, CERCLA admittedly discouraged the private development
of brownfield sites because of the potential imposition of strict liability for
environmental contamination. 25 As PRPs, many property owners and
developers feared undertaking the high risks of developing brownfields sites,
since they could be held financially responsible for both cleanup costs and
damages. In response, many owners left sites idle rather than redevelop

19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21. INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT:
A GUIDEBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 2001), available at
http://www.usmayors.org/brownfields/library/Brownfields_Redevelopment.pdf.
22.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2014).

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25. Steven M. Sommers & Michelle C. Kales, Acquiring and Disposing of Environmentally
Contaminated Property, Colo. Law., March 2005, at 11.
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their properties and thus open themselves up to liability for cleanup costs. 26
Noticing this, agency decisionmakers quickly took various steps to
encourage brownfields development despite the liabilities imposed by
CERCLA.
The EPA took a large step towards developing brownfields in 1995 with
the creation of the “Brownfields Program” dedicated solely to the
remediation and development of such sites. 27 The program encouraged the
“sustainab[le] reuse” of former brownfields sites, with peripheral goals of
adding tax revenue and job growth in addition to the more typical goals of
improving human health and environment at such sites. 28 The EPA has
declared that its goals in brownfields development include protecting the
environment, reducing blight, and steering development away from
greenfields and working lands. 29 Since 1995, the EPA estimates that the
Brownfields Program has leveraged more than $14 billion in brownfields
cleanup and redevelopment funding from the private and public sectors and
over 60,000 jobs. 30
In more recent attempts to alleviate CERCLA’s negative effects on
brownfields development, Congress passed the Small Business Liability
Relief and Brownfield Revitalization Act of 2002 (“Federal Brownfields
Amendments”). 31 The Federal Brownfields Amendments sought to protect
small businesses looking to develop brownfields from potential liability
under CERCLA. 32 The Act protects any purchaser of a brownfields site from
federal liability for cleanup costs when it qualifies as a “Bona Fide
Prospective Purchaser” (“BFPP”), thus encouraging such purchasers to buy
brownfields properties. 33 To qualify as a BFPP, however, the law imposes a
number of significant hurdles, and a potential developer must have:
(1) purchased the property after January 1, 2002;
(2) purchased a property at which all disposal of hazardous
waste occurred before such an acquisition;

26. Flannery P. Collins, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization
Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 303, 311 (2003).
27.

Brodsky, supra note 5.

28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE
supra note 3.

OF

SOLID WASTE

AND

EMERGENCY RESPONSE,

29. Brownfields, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
RESPONSE, http://epa.gov/brownfields.
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE
supra note 3.
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31.

42 U.S.C.A. § 9628 (West 2014).

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

OF

SOLID WASTE

AND

AND

EMERGENCY

EMERGENCY RESPONSE,

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer 2014

(3) made all necessary and appropriate inquiries into any
prior owners of the brownfield site, in accordance with
accepted commercial and customary standards;
(4) gave all legally required notices with respect to hazardous
substances on the property
(5) acted with appropriate care with respect to these
substances by taking steps to stop any continuing release;
prevent future releases; and prevent exposure to such
released substances;
(6) given full cooperation, assistance and access to the
property by federal and/or state agencies;
(7) complied with any land use or institutional controls
concerning the property;
(8) complied with any administrative subpoenas; and
(9) shown him or herself unaffiliated with any other person
potentially liable for costs of hazardous waste cleanup at
the site, whether through familial or contractual
relationships. 34
The Federal Brownfields Amendments provides additional protections to
properties remediated pursuant to a voluntary state cleanup program; these
kinds of sites are exempted to a large extent from future EPA enforcement
actions and also qualify for deferral of federal enforcement of CERCLA’s
provisions. 35 Private developers may assert a BFPP defense to liability for
cleanup costs, though these brownfields developers do bear the burden of
proof when asserting this type of defense. 36 For instance, developers must
comply with detailed EPA regulations regarding making the acceptable
“appropriate inquiries” into the previous ownership and use of the property,
including making these inquiries within one year of acquisition of the
property, reviewing state and local records, and gathering declarations by
environmental professionals as to the current contamination of the
property. 37
At the federal level, the EPA’s Land Revitalization Initiative fully
recognizes that these regulatory actions are part of a growing trend towards
restoring contaminated properties for the betterment of the community at
large. 38 The EPA created the initiative in 2003 to build on its earlier efforts

34.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2014).

35.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9628(b) (2014).

36. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 692, 749
(D.S.C. 2010).
37.

See 40 C.F.R. §§ 312 – 312.31 (2006).

38.

ALAN BERGER, DESIGNING THE RECLAIMED LANDSCAPE 142 (2008).
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to address the reuse of contaminated properties, and “instill a culture of
land reuse” throughout the country. 39 40

II. History of Brownfields Development In California
As mentioned in Part I, infra, California is home to a large number of
brownfields, tens of thousands of which lay idle. In California, the
Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) is the primary agency
tasked with overseeing brownfields development. 41 One of DTSC’s most
potent tools for the appropriate development of environmentally hazardous
sites is its ability to place limits on future uses of property based on the
level of cleanup necessary at the site. 42 Parcels of land with such title
prohibitions are known as “Land Use Restricted Sites.” 43 This categorization
encompasses many brownfields, whose titles generally have land use
restrictions on them due to the presence of hazardous substances.
Acting in its more proactive capacities, DTSC has cleaned up various
brownfields sites through its Site Mitigation and Brownfields Reuse Program
(“SMBRP”). Typically, DTSC completes an average of 125 cleanups per year,
and oversees more than 200 per year. 44 DTSC works closely with the
Regional Water Quality Control Boards (“Water Boards”), whose primary
function is facilitating the cleanup of hazardous substances that could
adversely affect water quality. 45 However, DTSC does not receive enough
funding to remediate any significant number of brownfields sites in
California, evident in DTSC’s limits on grants for developers at $200,000
cleanup grants and $200,000 revolving loan fund grants per site to qualified
entities. 46 DTSC’s internal financial failings and lack of organization
compound this lack of funding; an agency audit in May 2013 revealed that
DTSC had over $185 million in unrecovered costs from responsible parties.
Although the agency is now engaged in cost recovery efforts, this dollar

39.

Id.

40. EPA’s Land Revitalization Action Agenda, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 9,
2012), http://www.epa.gov/landrevitalization/agenda_full.htm.
41. Hazardous Waste, DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/
hazardouswaste.
42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, supra note 41.

45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS STATE REPORT REGION 9, available at
http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/state_tribal/update2011/bf_states_report_r9.pdf.
46. 2012 Brownfields Funding Workshop, DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL (May 7,
2012), www.dtsc.ca/gov/sitecleanup/brownfields/upload/bffunding_workshop_2012-2.pdf.
404
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amount indicates the general state of affairs in the DTSC. 47 Until 2012, RDAs
largely filled this void, and were responsible for the successful development
of a large percentage of remediated brownfields sites in California. 48

A. The Role of the Redevelopment Agency
The California legislature established RDAs in 1945 in order to
redevelop blighted areas using public funds, in turn serving compelling state
interests. 49 Although no concrete definition of “blight” exists, the California
Health and Safety Code includes a non-exhaustive list of the physical and
economic conditions that constitute a “blighted area.” 50 These conditions
include the presence of unsafe and dilapidated buildings, stagnant property
values, properties contaminated by hazardous waste, and abnormally high
numbers of abandoned commercial and residential buildings. 51 Prior to the
dissolution of RDAs in 2012, state law gave local governments authority to
create RDAs in order to revitalize and redevelop these kinds of deteriorated
areas. 52 Once formed, such agencies were primarily responsible for creating
redevelopment plans and providing initial funding for such plans in the
hopes of attracting private investment. 53
The initial funding for RDAs flowed largely from tax increment funding
(“TIF”), a lending model based on increasing expectations of property tax
values resulting from redevelopment activities. 54 TIF stems from the value
capture strategy utilized in public financing, whereby the government
attempts to “capture” the increases in private land values generated by
public investment. 55 These increases in value are most commonly the
increased tax revenue from improved infrastructure and transit options near

47. Memorandum from Director Deborah O. Raphael to Secretary for Environmental
Protection of the California Environmental Protection Agency Matt Rodriguez (May
30, 2013), available at http://dtsc.ca.gov/upload/FISMAMay2013.pdf.
48.

INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 21.

49.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33037 (West 2014).

50.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33031 (West 2014).

51.

Id.

52.

See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33037 (West 2014).

53.

Frequently Asked Questions About Redevelopment In California, CALIFORNIA
REDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, http://www.calredevelop.org/external/wcpages/wcwebcontent/
webcontentpage.aspx?contentid=266.
54.

Id.

55. Featured Topic: Value Capture, RECONNECTING AMERICA (2013), http://www.
reconnectingamerica.org/resource-center/value-capture/.
405

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer 2014

a land parcel or, at issue here, the tax increases from the use of remediated
brownfields sites for more productive ends. 56
Under the TIF model as used in California, once a community or
municipality creates a redevelopment area and/or project, the local agency
immediately “freezes” property tax revenue at the base level established in
that fiscal year. 57 For the life of the redevelopment project (generally limited
to 50 years), the local government automatically diverts any extra property
tax revenue generated above this base level to the local RDA as taxincrement revenue. Only two requirements were imposed upon this funding
to RDAs: (1) that 22% of the revenue be “passed through” to other local
agencies, including counties, school districts and cities; and (2) that 20% of
the RDA’s revenue go to funding low- and moderate-income housing. 58
Simply put, TIF allowed for public and private investors to borrow against
projected future tax revenue. 59 By 2010, RDAs in California were receiving
around $5 billion annually through TIF efforts. 60 TIF became the single
largest source of funding for affordable housing projects in the state. 61 As
will be discussed further in Part III.B, though TIF was instrumental in
brownfields and affordable housing development, it did divert varoius funds
from other city and county agencies, such as school districts, a reality that
would open these kinds of financing efforts up to intense criticism. 62
Through TIF and other efforts, RDAs helped facilitate brownfields
development by securing funding that may not have otherwise been
available and taking on the potential liabilities of environmental cleanup. 63
In regards to financing, RDAs consistently bore the brunt of the initial cost
of brownfields development projects and assumed much of the legal risk
involved with projects. The State and RDAs offered potential developers a
wide range of financial help, including revolving loan funds, tax-free bonds,

56.

Id.

57.

MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, SHOULD CALIFORNIA END
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES? (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/
2011/realignment/redevelopment_020911.pdf.
58.

Id. at 2.

59. RESTORING PROSPERITY, STATE POLICY PACKAGE: STATE-FACILITATED TIF TO
ENCOURAGE BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.restoringprosperity.
org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/brownfieldtifpackage.pdf.
60.

TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 7.

61. Value Capture, CENTER FOR HOUSING POLICY (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.
housingpolicy.org/toolbox/strategy/policies/capture_value.html?tierid=113458.
62.

Id.

63. Leah Goldberg, Brownfields Development After the Death of Redevelopment Agencies
in California, EPA Region 9 Brownfields Workshop (Nov. 8, 2012), available at http://
www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/workshop/pdf-2012/RDAs_Goldberg_11_8_12.pdf.
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private debt funds and grant money. 64 A substantial percentage of this
money came directly from TIF monies in RDA accounts. 65

B. The Polanco Act
Along with the substantial financial backing RDAs put towards
brownfields remediation, California state law afforded special protections to
these agencies. Even when adequate funding is available to purchase a
brownfields site, a developer is still vulnerable to a number of potential
legal liabilities, presenting an additional hurdle to development. Although
various escape valves exist, for instance the liability protections codified in
the relevant environmental and land use statutes, private parties still
struggle to meet these laws’ stringent remediation, monitoring, and reuse
requirements. 66 In addition, even these protections are often criticized for
their “unbalanced impact” on parties who have contributed in only minimal
ways towards site contamination. 67
To further encourage brownfields development, California took a
unique step by passing the Polanco Redevelopment Act (“Polanco Act”) in
1990, putting it at the forefront of brownfields development. 68 Legislators
passed multiple state laws such as the Polanco Act in order to ease the
potential of liability on private developers, as well as to empower RDAs to
better facilitate environmental site investigation and cleanup of
brownfields. 69 The Polanco Act authorized RDAs to take a variety of actions
to remedy the releases of hazardous substances from brownfields, including
requiring third-party property owners to either clean such waste materials
from their sites or pay the local RDA the entire costs of such a cleanup. 70
After some revisions, the Polanco Act took the national CERCLA liability
framework and applied it to RDA’s abilities to conduct local site cleanups
and development projects. 71 The law also authorized RDAs themselves to

64.

GROUP MCKENZIE, supra note 8.

65.

Id.

66.

Collins, supra note 26, at 309.

67.

Id.

68.

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 33459 to 33459.8.

69. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25395.60 to 25395.105, 33459 to
33459.8 (West 2014).
70.

Id.

71. Richard Opper, Eminent Domain and the Polanco Redevelopment Act, ENVIROLAWYER,
available at www.envirolawyer.com/Polanco_Power_Point.ppt.
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bring civil actions against responsible polluting parties to compel the
cleanup of contamination within the brownfields site. 72
The Act created a species of civil action claims for RDAs, allowing
these agencies to take direct legal action against the most reticent polluters.
The new law authorized RDAs to investigate all contaminated sites within
larger redevelopment areas, and subsequently issue 60-day notices to
property owners detailing hazardous waste cleanup requirements. 73
Property owners then had 60 days to propose a remedial action plan that
would cover the cleanup. If property owners did not propose a plan, the
local RDA could move ahead with its own action plan, and recoup the full
costs of implementation from the responsible parties. 74
Under the Polanco Act, RDAs could also recoup attorneys’ fees from
the polluting parties, another highly valuable tool for brownfields
development. 75 This provision was a useful instrument for RDAs, and
encouraged such agencies to incur the full costs of pursuing civil actions
against large polluters who may have previously been willing to spend large
amounts on litigation in order to draw out the legal process. 76 The provision
allowed RDAs to take on such parties and effectively remediate many
brownfields sites at little cost to the state government.
In addition to relief from attorneys fees, the Polanco Act provided
immunity from state and local liability to both RDAs and subsequent
property purchasers, including persons whom entered into agreements with
RDAs to redevelop brownfields properties and persons whom provided
financing to the current or subsequent property owner. 77 This limited
immunity would not extend towards any parties responsible for the release
of hazardous substances from such properties. 78
The provisions of the Polanco Act also worked in tandem with eminent
domain, further facilitating brownfields redevelopment. Because acquiring
property for RDA projects was considered a valid public use, local courts
allowed RDAs to use eminent domain to further along such property

72. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33459.3 (West 2014); Redevelopment Agency
of City of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4th 912, 916 (2003).
73.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33459.1 (West 2014).

74.

See id.

75.

Cal. Health & Safety Code. § 33459.4 (West 2014).

76.

Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 103 (2003).
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77.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33459.3 (West 2014).

78.

Id.
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acquisitions. 79 However, the provision that eminent domain could only be
used by RDAs in blighted areas constrained this power. 80
Since 1990, the Polanco Act has become a powerful tool for RDAs, who
used the protections to aid in the clean up and restoration of blighted and
toxic properties. 81 The DTSC and the former California Redevelopment
Agency jointly developed a prototype Environmental Oversight Agreement
(“EOA”) to further cement the protections of the Polanco Act. 82 Under the
DTSC’s guidance, RDA’s were exempted from DTSC’s legal requirements for
“Voluntary Cleanup Agreements” entered into with private developers; most
importantly, DTSC allowed RDAs to supervise and lead brownfields cleanups
without designation as a “responsible party,” thus exempting RDAs from
strict liability under federal and state environmental statutes. 83
Many former brownfield sites in California were developed primarily
through RDA actions and partnerships based on financial and legal
benefits—developments that many have argued were highly successful in
both remedying contaminated sites and turning delinquent properties into
revitalized community spaces improving both tax revenue and quality of
life. 84 A recent study on RDAs, sponsored by the California Redevelopment
Agency, found numerous economic benefits flowing from RDA projects. The
study concluded that RDAs generated $40 billion in total economic activity
between 2006 and 2007, have created over 300,000 part- and full-time jobs,
and have increased California’s state income by $22 billion since their
creation. 85

C. Case Study: Emeryville, California
One highly-touted example of a successful RDA project is in the city of
Emeryville, California, located just across the bay from San Francisco.
Formerly a large vacant and contaminated area that had been highly

79. Redevelopment Agency of Chula Vista v. Rados Bros., 95 Cal. App. 4th 309,
314 (2001); see Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33037 (West 2014).
80.

Redevelopment Agency of Chula Vista, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 314.

81. RICHARD DOTY, COX CASTLE NICHOLSON LLP, REDEVELOPING BROWNFIELDS USING
POLANCO ACT, available at http://www.coxcastle.com/images/ps_attachment/attach
ment109.pdf.

THE

82. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY ENVIRONMENTAL
OVERSIGHT AGREEMENT, (2004), available at http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/Brown
fields/upload/SMBRP_FS_EOA.pdf.
83.
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84.
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85. Gallo and Koehler, The Impact of Fiscal 2006-07 Community Redevelopment
Agency Activities on the California Economy, California Redevelopment Agency, June 2009.
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industrial in nature, various Emeryville sites have since been transformed
into a booming town complete with shopping mall, restaurants and highdensity housing. The Polanco Act was instrumental in the RDA’s acquisition
of property and subsequent cleaning up of the brownfield areas in
Emeryville. 86 The local RDA expended $25 million to acquire the property
and $11 million to fully remediate the land, thus taking a $36-million risk in
developing Emeryville. 87 This is a substantial amount of money, and a risk
likely too large for a single private investor. 88 Though the initial funds for
remediation came directly from the local RDA, 90% of these funds were
ultimately recovered through use of the Polanco Act’s financial remedies. 89
As a result of the RDA’s investment in brownfields sites in Emeryville, by
2002 new development had generated $5.4 million in tax increment funding
per year, over 8,400 new jobs had been created, and the total value of
development was estimated at $513 million. 90 These benefits accrued to an
area that had only years before been considered “blighted,” and filled with
properties contributing zero or negative tax funding to the city. City officials
note that such a successful project would not have come to fruition without
RDAs and the protections and powers of the Polanco Act. 91

IV. Post-Matosantos: the Demise of Redevelopment
Agencies in California
Assembly Bill 1X 26 (“AB 1X 26”) and the lawsuit that followed spelled
the official end of RDAs in the state, despite these organizations’ central role
in a large number of redevelopment successes. 92 The California Supreme
Court’s decision in California Redevelopment Association, et al. v. Matosantos
completely dissolved RDAs over one year ago. 93 Governor Brown’s proposed
budget for 2011-12, including AB 1X 27 and an associated bill AB 1X 27,

86.

Doty, supra note 81.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90. LIZ CONNOLLY, PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, BUILDING MUNICIPAL CAPACITY
FOR BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT IN WELLSTON, MISSOURI AND EMERYVILLE, CALIFORNIA: A
CASE STUDY (2004), available at http://pprc.umsl.edu/pprc.umsl.edu/data/connolly_occ
paper9.pdf.
91. Amber Evans & Marcus Nieback, How We Marketed and Developed Partnerships
for Reuse of Emeryville Brownfields, EPA REGION 9 BROWNFIELDS WORKSHOP, (Nov. 8, 2012),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/workshop/pdf-2012/Marketed_Dev
elop_Reuse_Nieback_11_8.pdf.
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included the dissolution of all RDAs in the state and the redistribution of
their funds to other local agencies. 94 These legislative actions came in the
midst of severe cuts to higher education, social welfare programs and state
agencies caused by the state budget deficit. 95 The California Supreme court
decided Matosantos in the midst of the state budget crisis; when Governor
Jerry Brown was elected in 2010, California’s 2010-11 budget deficit was
projected at $26 billion. 96
These bills attempted to remedy these kinds of funding deficits by
redistributing TIF revenues from RDAs to county auditor-controllers for
subsequent distribution to cities, counties and school districts. 97 AB 1X 26
mandated the immediate dissolution of RDAs, and AB 1X 27 would have
allowed cities to create alternative redevelopment agencies. 98 The proposed
cuts largely sprung from a report published by the Legislative Analyst Office
(“LAO”) in February 2011 that detailed alleged financial problems with the
redevelopment agency system. 99 The LAO study found that RDAs’ share of
local property taxes had grown from 2% to 12% since the agencies’ inception
over 60 years earlier. 100 As mentioned in Part II.B, infra, the report also found
that by 2010 RDAs were receiving over $5 billion in TIF. 101
Opponents of AB 1X 26 quickly filed for a writ of mandate triggering
the Matosantos lawsuit. 102 Plaintiffs argued that Governor Brown’s proposed
measures dissolving RDAs violated Proposition 22, a state Constitutional
measure which limited the state’s ability to require RDAs to make payments
on the state’s behalf for the state’s benefit. 103 Voters had recently passed
Proposition 22 largely through efforts by the California League of Cities, a
major funder, and the law amended the Constitution so as to specifically to
prevent the state from delaying the distribution of tax revenue from
transportation and redevelopment, e.g., locally imposed tax revenue, even in

94.

TAYLOR, supra note 57.

95. Adam Nagourney, For California, a New Month, a New Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18calif.html.
96. Adam Nagourney, Back From the Fiscal Abyss, California Balances Its Budget, N.Y.
T IMES, Jan. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/us/california-balancesits-budget.html?_r=0.
97.

Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 250.
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Id. at 241.

99. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, Should California End Redevelopment Agencies?,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/PubDetails.aspx?id=2440.
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the midst of financial hardship. 104 In Matosantos, the California Supreme
Court soundly rejected these arguments.
Ultimately, the Court held that because RDAs are “creatures of the
Legislature’s exercise of its statutory power,” the Legislature can both
expand and limit RDAs’ functions, including mandating their complete
dissolution. 105 The Court began with a lengthy analysis of the history of
public and municipal funding and redevelopment agencies in California. 106
The Court also found that no explicit provision in the California Constitution
mandated RDAs’ continued existence, and no clear evidence of legislative
intent demonstrated otherwise. 107 The Court struck the side bill AB 1X 27
law down as unconstitutional. 108
After the Matosantos ruling, AB 1X 26 was put into full force, and
legislators and government officials made a number of changes to
California’s Health and Safety Code in order to effectuate the dissolution of
RDAs. First, the new law required that “all authority, rights, powers, duties,
and obligations previously vested with the former redevelopment agencies”
be immediately vested with successor agencies (“SAs”). 109 The law makes
each newly created SA responsible for payment of all obligations entered
into by its prior RDA, a procedure organized by “Recognized Obligation
Payment Schedules.” 110 Enforceable obligations include, but are not limited
to: bonds, loans legally taken out by RDAs, payments required by the federal
government, preexisting obligations to the state or obligations imposed by
state law, court-imposed judgments against prior RDAs, and contracts
necessary for the administration of SAs. 111
However, the dissolution statute bar cities and counties from
classifying any agreements and arrangements between the city or county
that created the RDA and the former RDA, and/or contracts between the
former RDA and other public agencies to perform services outside the
redevelopment area, as enforceable obligations requiring ongoing

104. Proposition 22, CALIFORNIA CHOICES (2012), http://californiachoices.org/
ballot-measures/proposition-22.
105.

Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 256.

106.
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107.

Id. at 260.
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110. See MATTHEW S. GRAY ET AL., Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies Under AB1X
26: Wind-Down Requirements and Imminent Deadlines, P ERKINS C OIE (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.perkinscoie.com/dissolution-of-redevelopment-agencies-under-ab1x-26--w
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payment. 112
Examples of non-enforceable obligations include plans,
statements of intent, designations of redevelopment project areas, one-way
commitments by the former RDA without any parties other than the local
agency, and contracts that are too vague. 113
The new law also originally required SAs to sell off all land and assets
previously held by RDAs as “expeditiously” as possible and “in a manner
aimed at maximizing value.” 114 A later bill, Assembly Bill 1484 (“AB 1484”),
amended the Health and Safety Code to include more direction for SAs in
regards to these lands, and gave more flexibility to SAs for the continued
ownership of such properties. 115 Even so, in many respects, SAs’ collective
hands are tied: although required by law to sell properties for the maximal
value and in the shortest time possible, many RDAs held contaminated
properties that will likely sell for next to nothing, if anything at all. If the SAs
cannot sell these blighted sites, they will likely be stuck holding onto them.
However, unlike the predecessor RDAs, SAs so far lack the legal protections
the Polanco Act afford to RDAs to preemptively cleanup brownfields
properties themselves and then recoup the costs of such cleanups from the
private responsible parties. Further, if SAs cannot finish the brownfields
cleanups initiated by RDAs, they are unlikely to achieve the goals of state
law in generating more revenue for the state through the dissolution of
RDAs. Unfortunately, AB 1X 26 and its recent changes are silent on this
matter.
Cities and municipalities must return all remaining funds after RDA
dissolutions to the California Department of Finance for redistribution to
public agencies and school districts. 116 The California Supreme Court’s
original stay of the implementation of AB 1X 26 increased the amount of
local funds due back to the state. While the bill itself lay dormant, cities
continued to gather property tax revenues throughout the 2011-12 fiscal
year, many of which the Department of Finance (“DOF”) claims were
misallocated to inappropriate entities. 117 In July 2012, the DOF forced SAs to
choose to either make a complete “true up” payment, consisting of paying
back the entirety of funds allegedly misappropriated during the year, or face

112.

Id.

113. Redevelopment Agency Dissolution Under ABx1 26, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., http://www.
dof.ca.gov/redevelopment/RDA_dissolution_QandA/common_issues/view.php (last up
dated Nov. 28, 2012).
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severe penalties from the state. 118 This process has left many cities and
municipalities in deep debt to the state.
Health and Safety Code section 34175(b) set February 1, 2012, as the
definitive date for the transfer of RDA assets to the applicable SAs, and on
January 31, 2012, all RDAs officially closed. 119 Although state government
experts had projected $3.2-billion in General Fund savings from the
dissolution of RDAs, numbers pulled from the LAO report, more recent
estimates project that the state will save $1.8 billion less than originally
assumed in the 2012-13 budget, for a total of $1.4 billion in savings. 120

V. The Question Remains – How To Redevelop
Brownfields?
With the demise of RDAs came the demise of the associated benefits
conferred upon them by the Polanco Act and other key legislation, leaving a
clear void in public redevelopment work. The role of SAs as true successors
to RDAs is still largely unsettled, including whether or not the legal liability
protections afforded RDAs extend to such new agencies. A glaring question
is whether the Polanco Act applies to the SAs created in the wake of defunct
RDAs, or whether its protections apply only to these now-dead agencies. In
addition, questions remain regarding whether SAs and cities will be unable
to attract the requisite funding to both finish preexisting redevelopment
projects and begin new projects, leaving brownfields sites polluted and
underutilized.

A. Extending Legal Protections
The text of the Polanco Act explicitly spells out that its tools and
liability protections apply only to property located in redevelopment areas—
areas which were traditionally created and maintained by RDAs. 121 The Act
was instrumental in brownfields development in California during its 22-year
existence, and its protections should not cease to exist solely due to the
dissolution of RDAs. Many advocates recognize this stance, and towards
this end, in 2011 State Representative Roger Hernandez introduced

118.

Id.

119.

Goldberg, supra note 59.

120. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013-14 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S
FISCAL OUTLOOK (2012), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/bud/fiscal-outlook/
fiscal-outlook-2012.aspx.
121. Kristina Lawson & Craig Moyer, Unintended Environmental Consequences of the
Demise of Redevelopment in California, MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS (April 12, 2012), http://
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Assembly Bill 1235, which would have extended the immunities of the
Polanco Act to SAs looking to finish preexisting RDA brownfields
development projects. 122 Although the State Legislature ultimately passed
the bill, by this time various political forces had transformed it from a bill
concerning the Polanco Act into a bill about energy efficiency, and the
legislature amended its text in August 2012 to remove any extension of the
Polanco Act’s protections to SAs. 123
In 2012 Senator Fran Pavley introduced Senate Bill 1335 to authorize
SAs to retain control of brownfields sites. 124 The bill provides in relevant
part that:
a successor agency may, subject to the approval of an oversight
board pursuant to Section 34180, retain land of property
obtained by the former redevelopment agency that is a
brownfield site for the purpose of the remediation or removal of
the release of hazardous substances . . . using available
financing, funds obtained from a responsible party, existing state
or federal grants, or any other funds at the disposal of the
successor agency in order to maximize value of the asset. Upon
completion of the remediation or removal of hazardous
substances from the brownfield site, the successor agency shall
dispose of the property pursuant to paragraph (1). 125
Throughout April and May of 2012, the Senate Environmental Quality,
Governance and Finance and Appropriation Committees all passed SB
1335. 126 However, while the Senate Appropriations Committee held the bill,
it became inactive on November 11, 2012. 127
Assembly Bill 1484 (“AB 1484”), passed in June of 2012, represents
another recent development in the post-RDA world. The act amended state
law, providing that “[a]ny existing cleanup plans and liability limits

122. AB 1235, Cal. Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml;jsessionid=937b099710861d
9d8e842c2dc312?bill_id=201120120AB1235.
123.

Id.

124. See Post-Redevelopment Legislation Update, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES (April
19, 2012), http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/News-Articles/2012/April/Post-Redevelop
ment-Legislation-Update.
125. SB 1335, Cal. Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at
http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/billtrack/text.html?bvid=20110SB133596AMD.
126. See SB 1335 - Redevelopment: brownfield sites, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
INFORMATION, available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml.
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authorized under the Polanco Redevelopment Act . . . [s]hall be transferred
to the successor agency and may be transferred to the successor housing
entity at that entity’s request.” 128 AB 1484 made several helpful changes to
state law that are pertinent to the management and remediation of
brownfields properties. AB 1484 modified AB 1x 26 to require that each SA
submit a Long-Range Property Management Plan detailing the SA’s
inventory and planned use of the former RDA’s properties. 129 Such plans
must include detailed descriptions of the historic environmental
contamination on the site, including the site’s previous designation as a
brownfield. 130
Going forward, permissible uses of properties include the retention of
the property for governmental use pursuant to subdivision (a) of the Health
& Safety Code section 34181, the retention of the property for future
development, the sale of the property, and/or the use of the property to
fulfill an enforceable obligation.” 131 SAs may transfer properties categorized
for “government use” under section 34191.5, including properties used for
governmental purposes, including roads, school buildings, parks, libraries
and local agency buildings, to the appropriate public jurisdictions. 132
Property, including brownfields sites, may be transferred from an SA to the
local City if a formerly approved redevelopment plan exists. 133
Although this law may seem to solve the problem of limiting liability
for public entities in redevelopment of brownfields, many questions remain.
Section 34173(e) established that the liability of SAs “shall be limited to the
extent of the total sum of property tax revenues it receives pursuant to this
part and the value of assets transferred to it as a successor agency for a
dissolved redevelopment agency.” 134 Unfortunately, the successor city or
county may not take actions that would increase in any way the size,
boundaries or obligated property tax necessary for enforceable obligations
authorized as of June 27, 2011. 135 Although section 34173(i) of the Health
and Safety Code provides that the city and/or county may request all land
use-related plans and functions of the former redevelopment agency,
anything created for redevelopment purposes after June 27, 2011, is
considered null under the new law. 136
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These provisions allow SAs, cities and counties to continue work on
preexisting redevelopment plans for brownfields, but do freeze any
brownfields development essentially as it existed on June 27, 2011. SAs may
not pursue new funding, nor take any actions that may increase debt. The
SAs may only issue bonds under preexisting enforceable obligations carried
over from the prior RDAs. 137 Moreover, it is not clear how these new
provisions work with conflicting AB 1X 26 provisions such as its section
34163(b), which prohibits successor agencies of any kind from entering into
new redevelopment contracts, including remediation and rehabilitation. 138

B. Alternative Funding
Even if the legal liability protections from the Polanco Act do indeed
transfer to SAs, a tenuous possibility, the fact remains that little funding
exists for such agencies to effectively carry out existing cleanup plans as well
as to engage in useful and productive value capture strategies. Brownfields
developers have historically depended largely on grants, loans and tax
incentives—much of which came directly from RDAs. 139 As noted in Part
III.B, infra, RDAs based the majority, if not all, of their brownfields
redevelopment on TIF monies. Current law bans the use of TIF, and there is
a real possibility that brownfield development projects will stall completely
due to a severe shortage of funds. The DTSC’s Revolving Loans Fund (“RLF”)
and the EPA’s Assessment and Cleanup Grants make up the bulk of public
agency funding for brownfields development, especially those development
projects based on public-private partnerships and investment. 140
Municipalities must both pay off their debt and make up the difference in
funding for future projects using creativity and a patchwork of district
financing and special taxes. 141
The DTSC RLF program provides funding of up to $1 million to
developers, businesses, schools and local governments for remediation
projects. 142 Funding may go to either public or private entities, so long as

137.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34177(a) (West 2014).

138.
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they meet the program eligibility requirements. 143 Unlike RDA projects
based on TIF, RLF funds will not cover the typically substantial costs of precleanup site assessments, thus the initial environmental assessments of
brownfields required by state and federal law must be complete at the time
of application for RLF. 144
Since 1993, DTSC has also administered the Voluntary Cleanup
Program for brownfields designated as low-priority hazardous waste sites. 145
Under this program, DTSC enters site-specific agreements with project
developers, which include for DTSC oversight of the site’s environmental
assessment, investigation, and remediation actions. 146 The program also
adds a “cloak of reasonableness” to developer’s actions, especially if such
actions are evaluated in the judicial system. 147 The Voluntary Cleanup
Program requires brownfields project proponents to pay all DTSC’s
reasonable costs for those services provided. 148
EPA Assessment and Clean-up Grants are another source of funding,
but are unavailable to private entities. 149 The Clean-up Grant provides for up
to $200,000 per site to a public entity, while the Assessment Grant provides
for up to $300,000 per site, or $1 million for a grouping of three sites. 150
These funds are only available to tribal, state, and local governments, as
well as eligible nonprofits. 151 The EPA also engages in a small number of
free “Targeted Brownfields Assessment” for eligible public and nonprofit
entities. 152 However, to qualify for EPA funds, the applicant public agency
must demonstrate that through its response program it will:
(1) Make a timely survey and inventory of existing brownfields sites;

143. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, CALIFORNIA BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP
REVOLVING LOAN FUND (RLF) PROGRAM (2008), available at http://dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/
Brownfields/upload/final-RLF-FACT-SHEET78-4-08-2.pdf.
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(2) Oversight and enforcement mechanisms exist ensuring that any
actions taken will protect the environment and public health;
(3) Mechanisms exists to provide for meaningful public participation;
and
(4) Mechanisms exist to approve cleanup plans and verify that cleanup
153
is complete.
In an environment without RDAs, the fourth step is most problematic
for future brownfields development. Current law does not allow SAs to
approve new cleanup plans, and even if the law is amended to allow SAs this
capability, this type of statutory right would not as a matter of course
include the necessary additional enforcement and oversight mechanisms
that RDAs held.
The California Recycle Underutilized Sites Program (“CALReUSE”) is
another option for localities my use to fill the void left behind in brownfields
development post-AB 1X 26. The Legislature funded CALReUSE in 2007
with $60 million to provide grants and forgivable loans to help fund site
assessments, technical assistance, remedial action plans and site access to
brownfields. 154 Like other programs through the state, CALReUSE maintains
fairly strict criteria for acceptance into the program. The proposed
development project must create or promote residential or mixed use
development, be located in a designated infill area, be consistent with local
land use plans, and have a preexisting cleanup plan approved by the
appropriate oversight agency. 155 Like the DTSC and EPA grant programs,
CALReUSE presents similar problems for the remediation of brownfields
through development. The most glaring complication is the program’s
requirement to locate the development project in a designated infill area;
although an infill area may overlap with the boundaries of a brownfields
site, this depends more on serendipity than a guarantee. Even if developers
and local governments surmount these siting challenges, at this point in
time the CALReUSE program is largely oversubscribed, and no new
applications are being accepted. 156
A distinct option known as an infrastructure finance district (“IFD”)
exists for cities and counties who cannot garner enough support from the

153. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF BROWNFIELDS AND LAND USE REVITALIZATION,
FUNDING GUIDANCE FOR STATE AND TRIBAL RESPONSE PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2013, available at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/proposal_guides/FY13-128(a)-Guidance-final.pdf.
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more traditional government grants and loans described above, and this
option may be the most important source of funding for brownfields
development in the future. An IFD municipal funding scheme allows
taxpayers within a specified area to vote on whether to divert part of the city
or county’s General Fund to finance government projects. 157 The Legislature
adopted this little-used source of public funding in 1990 to allow for cities
and counties to create IFDs, divert tax revenues to them, and issue bonds in
order to provide citizens with better-funded public infrastructure. 158 Unlike
redevelopment areas, property within an IFD does not have to be
categorized as “blighted.” 159
However, IFD funding is limited to “public capital facilities of
communitywide significance” which provide “significant benefits” to an area
larger than the district itself. 160 These include, but importantly are not
limited to: highways, interchanges, ramps and bridges, arterial streets,
parking facilities, and transit facilities, sewage treatment and water
reclamation plants and interceptor pipes, facilities for the collection and
treatment of water for urban uses, flood control levees and dams, retention
basins, and drainage channels, child care facilities, libraries, parks,
recreational facilities, and open space, and facilities for the transfer and
disposal of solid waste, including transfer stations and vehicles. 161 Once
these properties are developed, however, IFDs may not fund ongoing
maintenance, services and repairs, or operating costs, and currently must be
in substantially undeveloped areas. 162 Further, an IFD may not encompass
any part of a redevelopment project area previously created, which dampens
the potential for brownfields redevelopment on such parcels. 163
Despite the creative funding and liability steps taken by cities and
municipalities across the state, current law does not make clear how
brownfields redevelopment should best proceed in an environment where
RDAs have ceased to exist, and their redevelopment project areas and plans

157. Melissa Griffin, Infrastructure Finance District Could Be New Way to Fund
Redevelopment, S.F. EXAMINER (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/columnists/
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Development (Apr. 26, 2011), available at www.edacademy.org/wp-content/uploads/.../
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have been passed on to SAs, cities, and counties. In this case, perhaps the
lengthy list of prohibitions on the acceptable uses of IFD funds should also
disappear. Only then would IFDs represent an enticing source of future
funding for brownfields development. As the law currently stands, however,
the majority of brownfields sites lay in previously created redevelopment
sites, and are thus outside the scope of IFD funding.
Assembly Bill 2144 (“AB 2144”), under consideration in 2012, would
have amended existing law to make IFD funding more accessible to the
owners of former and current redevelopment areas. 164 The bill represented
an attempt by legislators to reestablish some of the redevelopment powers
taken away by AB 1X 26. AB 2144 would have authorized the creation of
infrastructure and revitalization financing districts and allowed for the issuance
of debt with 55% voter approval instead of the two-thirds majority currently
required. 165 As part of the “revitalization,” the bill would have also
authorized an IFD to finance projects in both current and former
redevelopment project areas, as well as former military bases. 166 The
overarching purpose of AB 2144 was to amend existing law so that an IFD
could fund a wider variety of projects, including brownfields restoration, the
purchase of property for development purposes, and environmental
mitigation efforts. 167 The bill would have also extended the critical
immunities that the Polanco Act granted IFD-initiated development
actions. 168
In September 2012, however, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed AB 2144,
claiming that “[e]xpanding the scope of infrastructure financing districts is
premature. This measure would likely cause cities to focus their efforts on
using the new tools provided by the measure instead of winding down
redevelopment. This would prevent the state from achieving the General
Fund savings assumed in this year’s budget.” 169 As a result, IFD law remains
as it was in 1990, along with its prohibitions on funding that make the use of
IFD for brownfields development quite challenging.
However, the Legislature had another chance to amend IFD law to
make it more accessible for new redevelopment activities exists through
Senate Bill 33, which was introduced on December 3, 2012, by Senator

164. AB 2144, Cal. Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at
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Wolk. 170 If passed, the bill would make the use and creation of IFDs easier
for local governments by removing the statutory requirement that voters
approve the IFD’s issuance of debt, and expand the use of such funding to a
wider variety of projects. 171 Funding would not come out of the general fund,
however, unlike banned tax increment funding. 172 Though the bill still exists,
the Senate placed it in its “inactive file” on September 11th, 2013. 173
The use of Mello-Roos Community Facilities District (“CFD”) funding
provides another option for cities looking to continue redevelopment efforts
while allowing for a broader range of projects than an IFD. A CFD is an area
within which a city imposes a special tax, higher than the normal, on
properties in order to provide additional revenue to pay the interest and
principal on issued bonds so that the city may raise redevelopment funds for
public improvements. 174 California Government Code section 53313.5 lists a
nonexhaustive number of projects that CFD may be used for, including:
making “energy efficiency, water conservation, and renewable energy
improvements” to real properties, repairing soil deterioration caused by
privately held properties, bringing properties into compliance with seismic
regulations, and constructing and public utilities transmission and
distribution facilities. 175
Many cities and municipalities like the City and County of San
Francisco already utilize CFD funding for new projects. In early February
2013, San Francisco RDA’s successor agency became the first such agency in
the state to issue new bonds since the dissolution of the state’s RDAs,
selling $123 million of debt left over from the former San Francisco RDA. 176
SAs must earmark the funds for repayment of the tax bonds previously
issued by the RDA for the Mission Bay Redevelopment North and South
Project, as well as reimburse this project’s master developer. 177 Although
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this is a positive development for redevelopment in the city, and will bring
an influx of cash to the city, the anticipated funding falls short of the
estimated $700 million cost of full completion of the project. 178

C. Local Recapture of Redevelopment Funds
Since the decision in Matosantos, some in the development industry
have deemed our time the era of “missing tax increment funding,”
responsible for stalled projects across the state. 179 Some cities have
responded to these changes by refusing to return their remaining
redevelopment funds back to the state, the majority of which come from the
20% of TIF that RDAs were required to pay into affordable housing. 180 In
Santa Clara, for instance, the mayor and city council recently sent a letter to
constituents asking them to allow the city to take steps towards retaining a
large chunk of redevelopment funds. 181 California is currently asking Santa
Clara for over $300 million back in redevelopment assets, and the fight over
the redistribution of RDA assets has led to delays in the construction of a
school, public park and even a low-income senior housing project. 182
Further north, in Oakland, Mayor Jean Quan is attempting to move
forward with plans to use $18 million in redevelopment funding for
affordable housing, despite admonitions against such actions from the
California Department of Finance. 183 In July 2013, the Oakland City Council
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passed a proposal to set aside 25% of all former redevelopment TIF revenue
funds that will be redistributed by the state to local county, school districts
and other entities into the Oakland Affordable Housing Trust Fund. 184
In addition to tax recapture mechanisms, courts have also become a
popular avenue for cities to voice their grievances over the new law. Over
fifty cities filed lawsuits against the state in order to recoup monies loaned
by cities to former redevelopment agencies, and to protest the state Finance
Department’s rejections of various redevelopment projects as enforceable
obligations. 185 Most notably, the League of California Cities filed a
complaint against the state in October 2012, alleging that AB 1484
unconstitutionally reallocates local sales and use taxes from cities to the
state Department of Finance. 186 The League of California Cities’ primary
claim is that AB 1484’s “true-up” payment system, which requires local SAs
to pay back alleged overpayments of tax increment to RDAs prior to their
dissolution, unfairly takes money from city coffers to cover SAs inabilities to
pay. 187 After a ruling against the League of California Cities, in September
2013 the judge presiding over the case granted their motion for
reconsideration based on new facts. 188 Though these lawsuits are still quite
new, the state could be liable for over $3 billion to cities and counties if
such suits ultimately succeed, a number that exceeds the money saved by
dissolving RDAs. 189
If cities fail to recoup redevelopment funds, they may be exposed to
third-party lawsuits for choosing to cancel or scale back existing
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redevelopment projects. These kinds of actions could be construed as a
breach of contract, and substantial amounts of development and land use
funds are at stake in the battle. 190 However, these suits may be unavoidable
to a certain extent as a byproduct of the dissolution of RDAs, and cities will
have to invariably seek out a patchwork of different types of financing to
replace missing redevelopment funds. These alternative sources of funding,
though they exist to varying degrees, are unlikely to completely replace the
deficits left in city budgets by AB 1X 26.

V. Conclusion
A potentially debilitating budget crisis provided a fitting background
for the Matosantos ruling and AB 1X 26, and the financial desperation
stemming from this desperate reality undoubtedly clouded Governor Jerry
Brown’s radical budget actions. Now, the state has rebounded from its
steep budget deficit of over $26 billion only three years ago to a projected
budget surplus of $2.3 billion for the fiscal year 2014-15. 191 This budget
surplus casts doubt upon the ultimate propriety of the dissolution of RDAs,
and increasing calls for the reinstatement and recreation of such agencies
can be heard in light of this reality. However, until that day comes, if ever,
cities and counties will have to become even more creative in how they
sustainably develop brownfields and hazardous sites within their
boundaries. Despite sharp decreases in local funding, urban revitalization
and economic and community development must continue to progress in
California, and brownfields remain promising locations for such growth.
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